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If We Pay Football
Players, Why
Not Kidney Donors?
The risks are lower and the screening process more rigorous for kidney donors.

A

✒ BY PHILIP J. COOK AND KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC

variety of laws regulate, tax, or prohibit risky
activities. A number of these laws are paternalistic in the sense that they seek to protect
the willing participants in these activities
rather than prevent harm to third parties.
Likewise, paternalistic concern for donors’
welfare is a key motivation for stringent regulation of living kidney donation.
Although living kidney donation is a common medical procedure and donors usually enjoy a full recovery, the loss of a kidney
poses long-term health risks, in particular that of renal failure if
the donor’s remaining kidney fails. In the United States and most
every other country (with the notable exception of Iran), kidney
donation is permitted but financial compensation for donors is
prohibited. Not only is there no legal market for kidneys, donors
in the United States are often not even reimbursed for their full
out-of-pocket cost in making the donation.
The ban on compensation may protect potential donors from
the temptation of easing their financial situation by giving up a
kidney, a choice they may regret in later years. But this regulation
has dire consequences.
The need for transplantable kidneys is great, far exceeding current availability from deceased and living donations. The official
waiting list of Americans with renal failure is now approximately
100,000, with a typical wait time of five years or more. Those on
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the waiting list are kept alive by dialysis, which is both costly to
taxpayers (because Medicare pays for a large percentage of the costs)
and debilitating to the patients. Even with dialysis, thousands of
renal-failure patients die each year for want of a suitable kidney.
This wait could be largely eliminated by easing the current ban
on compensation for donors. An adequate supply of living donors
would be especially valuable because living donors tend to provide
higher quality kidneys with greater opportunity for developing a
close tissue match, thus reducing the chance of rejection. Current
estimates suggest that if compensation were permitted, the cost
of payments for recruiting an adequate number of donors would
be substantially less than the savings from reducing the number
of renal patients on dialysis at government expense.
In this article we contrast the compensation ban on organ
donation with the legal treatment of football and other violent
sports in which both acute and chronic injuries to participants are
common. While there is some debate about how best to regulate
these sports in order to reduce the risks, there appears to be no
debate about whether participants should be paid. For the best
adult football players, professional contracts worth multiple millions of dollars are the norm. A ban on professionalism in football
would be the end of the National Football League, which is currently the highest grossing sports league in the world; the NFL
collected $13 billion in revenue in 2016 and each of the 32 teams
has a market value of anywhere from $1.6 billion to $4.8 billion.
While the recent evidence on the long-term medical damage
from concussion has caused widespread concern, there is no
prominent voice calling for a ban on professional football. Indeed,
a ban is unthinkable in the foreseeable future. That observation
helps illustrate the importance of history, custom, and established
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interests in shaping the debate over regulating risky activity. But
if we could start fresh, the current configuration of activities for
which compensation is banned would seem very odd.
If ethical concerns persuade thoughtful people that the “right”
answer is to ban compensation for kidney donation, then the
same logic would suggest that compensation should also be
banned for participation in violent sports. If the “right” answer is
to permit compensation for participation in violent sports, then
compensation for kidney donation
should also be permitted. We see
no logical basis for the current
combination of banning compensation for kidney donors
while allowing compensation
for football players and boxers.
THE RISKS TO
PARTICIPANTS

Each year in the United States,
6,000 people donate a kidney,
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voluntarily and without compensation for assuming the medical
risks from surgery and living with just one kidney. We compare
those risks with the risks stemming from participation in violent
sports that do not ban inducements for participation at the highest level. Although the comparison is not perfect, we provide some
statistics that suggest that a man who signs a contract to play in
the NFL for a year is consenting to be exposed to far greater medical
risks than someone who volunteers to donate a kidney.
Kidney donation / The immediate risks from surgery can be briefly
summarized. A systematic review and meta-analysis of the literature found that there were post-operative complications in
7.3% of cases, which the authors deemed a “low complication
rate.” Complications included wound infection (1.6%) and bleeding (1.0%). A questionnaire study of donors three months
after their operation found that 18.5% rated their overall
health as “somewhat worse” than before, suggesting
that over 80% had fully recovered in a subjective sense.
The most serious outcome, death, is quite rare. A study
of 80,347 donors over the period 1994–2009 determined
that there had been 25 deaths, for a rate of 3.1 per 10,000
operations. That is about twice as high as the annual
chance of being killed in a motor vehicle accident for
the most relevant age group (45–64) during that period.
Following recovery, donors typically do not suffer
disability related to the loss of their remaining kidney because one functioning kidney does everything
required for normal functioning of the body. The longterm mortality risk was no higher for living donors
than for age- and comorbidity-matched participants in
a large longitudinal health survey (NHANES III). Similarly, an analysis of 3,368 donors age 55 and over found
no difference in all-cause mortality in comparison with a
matched sample from the Health in Retirement Survey.
The only exception to this null conclusion is a study
of Norwegian donors that found a divergence in the
mortality rates after 10 years, so that by 25 years 18% of
the donors had died compared with 13% of the matched
controls. A recent review article confirms that there is no difference in death rates for at least the first 10 years, and that the
Norwegian study’s conclusion of divergence after that has not
been replicated.
What about the particular threat that a donor’s remaining kidney will fail, which in the absence of an immediate
transplant would mean that the donor will have to go on
dialysis? The best study of donors in the United States
found a higher cumulative incidence of failure and
end stage renal disease (ESRD) for donors than
non-donors, 0.31% versus 0.04%. While the risk
is significantly elevated for donors, it remains
very low in an absolute sense, representing an
increased risk of about 1 in 400.
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Finally, a questionnaire study of 2,455 donors who were
between five and 48 years from their surgery found that 84%
were satisfied with their lives. The likelihood of satisfaction was
enhanced by the donors’ feeling that their gift had positive effects
on their relationships.
Football / One challenge in making a meaningful comparison
between the risks entailed in kidney donation and the risks
entailed in participation in contact sports is that the latter may
stretch out for many years and involve not one choice (donate or
not) but a series of choices regarding participation. The young
men who are drafted into the NFL each year have almost all
played organized football for a number of years, including in
high school and college, and have been exposed to the risk of
injury throughout. Various comparisons of football with the
single act of donation may be possible, such as “play in one game”
or “play for one season.” But given that our focus is on inducements, we take a somewhat different approach and focus on the
risks associated with a professional career as the unit of account.
Rough physical contact is part of the game of football and
injuries are common from an early age. For boys less than 20 years
old, football, among all the sports and other types of recreational
activities, is the most common cause of injury requiring a trip to
the emergency room. An analysis of emergency room visits for
2001–2009 estimated there were 350,000 youths per year treated
for football injuries, almost all males.
Of these, 25,000 were treated for non-fatal traumatic brain
injuries (TBI), typically concussion, of which over half (13,667) were
males age 15–19. About 1.5 million males in this age group played
organized tackle football in 2009, and if we can assume that most
of the injuries affected those rather than youths playing pick-up
games, the treated TBI injury rate was close to 1%. The overall rate
is probably much higher because most concussions are not treated.
An alternative set of national estimates links concussion risk to
game exposure for school football teams. The authors’ estimates
suggest that over the course of a 10-game playing season, a high
school player would have a 1.55% chance of being concussed and
a college player a 3.0% chance. These statistics are somewhat out
of date and there has been a strong upward trend in reported
concussions in organized football—in part because of the national
“Heads Up” campaign initiated by the Centers for Disease Control
in 2004, increased media attention, and the passage of youth
sports concussion laws in all 50 states. These laws specify that
young players with possible concussions must be removed from
the game and cleared for return by a set protocol.
A recent report by Harvard Law School found that in 2016, the
2,274 active players in the NFL experienced 2,066 injuries during
the preseason and regular season, in which “injury” is defined as
an event recorded by the team trainer that would typically require
time lost from practice or game. Of those injuries, 244 were concussions, which works out to 0.073 concussions per player-season.
At 7.3%, that is over twice the rate for college players and about

equal to the rate of surgical complications in kidney donation.
A recent study of “life after football” brings together the official
injury reports and survey information to paint a grim picture. The
authors report that 93% of former NFL players missed at least
one game as a result of injury and half had three or more major
injuries, often requiring surgery. For a substantial majority, injuries ended their career or contributed to the decision to end their
career. Nine of 10 former players have nagging aches and pains
from football when they wake up, and for most the pain lasts all
day. For those age 30–49, the ability to work is impaired by injury.
But what has garnered considerable recent attention and concern is the high percentage of former players who have chronic
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) by the time they die. CTE is a
progressive neurodegeneration associated with repetitive head
trauma, with a variety of symptoms: impulsivity, depression,
apathy, anxiety, explosivity, episodic memory loss, and attention
and executive function problems. A recent postmortem study of
a sample of donated brains of former NFL players found that
110 of 111 indicated either mild or (more commonly) severe CTE.
Interviews with family members found that behavior, mood, and
cognitive symptoms were common among this group.
These findings do not imply that 99% of former NFL players
will have CTE. The brains in this study were voluntarily submitted
for examination by family members who were often motivated by a
desire to know the cause of their loved ones’ dementia or other neurological problems—which is to say, the brains of those who died
without such problems may be largely missing from the sample.
But the 111 brains do represent 8.5% of the 1,300 former NFL
players who died during the period that these brains were donated.
That places something of a logical lower bound on the prevalence
of CTE. Presumably the true prevalence is much higher than 8.5%.
The other problem with these remarkable findings is that they
do not provide a direct indication of the cause or causes of the CTE
and associated disabilities. Repetitive head trauma is recognized as
a necessary but not sufficient condition for CTE. The subjects had
been exposed to repetitive head trauma throughout their careers
as football players, which typically would have started in high
school or well before. In fact, there is some evidence that age at first
exposure to football may be related to the likelihood of impaired
cognitive performance by former football players. Elite players who
choose to go professional following college likely increase their
chances of neurological problems in later life, which are already
high as a result of their exposure up to that point. Unfortunately,
the science does not provide a basis for sorting out the additional
contribution of an NFL career to this health burden.
While it is not possible to do a precise “apples to apples” comparison of the medical risks associated with kidney donation and
the risks associated with a professional football career, it seems
clear that the acute risk of injury and of long-term disability are
far higher for the football player. As discussed above, most NFL
veterans live out their lives following retirement with serious physical and mental disabilities. The vast majority of kidney donors lead
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entirely normal lives following recovery from the initial operation.
THE LIMITS OF CONSENT

Ordinarily, people are born with two kidneys but they only need
one to sustain full health. For that reason, adults can donate
a kidney and, after recovering from the operation, expect their
life span and health will not be much affected. Still, as explained
above, there are risks entailed in the operation, and the loss of
redundancy in kidney function may cause medical problems in
later life if a donor is unlucky enough to suffer kidney failure.
Concern for the potential kidney donor’s welfare motivates a
variety of restrictions on donation, including a ban on financial
compensation. This ban is paternalistic: it deprives donors of
compensation in part because the allure of a financial payoff may
cause some people to choose to donate against what might be
considered, given the risks, their “true” best interests.
Is that restriction justified? Whether and when sane, sober, wellinformed adults should be banned by government authority from
choosing to engage in an activity that risks their own life and limb
is an ancient point of contention. There are a variety of hazardous
activities that are permitted with no legal bar to receiving compensation. Included on this list are such occupations as logging, roofing,
commercial fishing, and military service. Also included are violent
sports such as football, boxing, and mixed martial arts. These examples illustrate a broad endorsement of the principle that consenting
adults should be allowed to exchange (in a probabilistic sense) their
physical health and safety for financial compensation, even in some
instances in which the ultimate product is simply entertainment.
The Harm Principle and external effects / In the search for a princi-

pled basis for setting legal boundaries on self-hazardous choices,
a natural starting point is the tenet that adult choices that do
not hurt others should be allowed by government. This Harm
Principle was developed by John Stuart Mill in his classic treatise
On Liberty (1859). It provides a rationale for the view that adults
in the possession of their faculties should be free to choose to
engage in risky activities if that choice does not harm others
who are not part of the bargain. In this view, paternalistic regulations—those imposed for the individual’s own good—should be
limited to restrictions on children or on adults who are not in a
position to make free and well-informed choices.
While the Harm Principle appears to create a broad scope for
individual autonomy, governments limit autonomy if negative
external effects are considered problematic. Most individuals are
enmeshed in a web of sentiment and responsibility to family members, neighbors, coworkers, and others. Thus, a risky choice that
results in injury or death will tend to have harmful consequences
for other people, including those who had no direct authority or
influence over that choice. Furthermore, third-party effects are
created by participation in private and government insurance
programs and eligibility for safety-net programs in which any
financial costs (for medical care, for example) are broadly shared.
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In the case of living kidney donation, the direct external effects
include considerable surplus of benefit over cost. Enhancing the
quality and quantity of kidneys available for transplantation
would reduce disability and save lives among patients while also
saving the cost (to taxpayers) of maintaining these patients on
dialysis. Hence for kidney donation—unlike, say, dueling or boxing (or a great variety of other risky activities)—it appears that the
external effects are far more positive than negative.
Cognitive biases and limitations / The belief that adults are able to
discern and act on their true interests when faced with complex
choices is basic to Mill’s argument for freedom from government
interference. During the last half-century, economists and behavioral scientists have explored the limitations and biases in decisionmaking, demonstrating that even sane and sober adults tend to
make systematic errors. When the stakes are high, as they are in
choosing to donate a kidney or play professional football, even a
free-choice advocate may accept that some limits are warranted.
Here we very briefly consider the relevant issues and conclude
that if the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) were
amended to allow payments to donors, potential kidney donors
could be protected against being unduly tempted through the
existing structure of screening, counseling, and delay. In contrast,
it is not clear that NFL recruits have similar protections in place.
In the ideal, a rational person faced with an important decision
(donate a kidney, sign a contract to play professional football)
would want to proceed as a decision analyst would instruct. The
goal is to combine the objective consequences of the option with
the individual’s subjective valuation of those consequences, including timing (now versus later) and likelihood. This rational person
might go about making her decision using the following the exercise:

List all possible consequences over one’s lifetime.
■■ Estimate the probability of each consequence.
■■ Assess the utility gain or loss of each consequence according
to the decision-maker’s own preferences.
■■ Calculate whether the expected value in terms of utility
gains and losses is positive.
■■

Needless to say, that is not how such decisions are made in
practice, although in the case of kidney donation (and not football) much of the relevant information will at least be provided as
part of the counseling required of potential donors. The difficulty
of making an informed decision is greater because the decider can
only go down that path once.
The issue is actually not whether individuals should be trusted
to act like well-informed decision analysts, but rather whether
they could benefit from legal restrictions on the menu of possibilities available to them. This challenge has become better
focused as research in behavioral science has documented the
tendency of adults to make systematic errors in their decisions.
Much of this research has focused on choices that have uncertain
outcomes, or outcomes that are distributed over time, or require

16 / Regulation / SPRING 2018
H E A LT H & M E D I C I N E

the decisionmaker to predict her sense of well-being under the
scenarios implied by the available choices. For example, people
tend to discount the value of delayed consequences according to
how far in the future they would be experienced and can make
sensible choices between prospects that offer a payoff in one year
or a larger payoff in two years. However, prospects with immediate
payoffs are often tempting out of proportion to their objective
value and induce impulsive choices that are later regretted.
It is helpful to deconstruct the decision to donate a kidney
under both the current regime (no compensation) and a hypothetical regime (in which the donor would be financially compensated). Living donation is an arduous process that would not
be undertaken by a well-informed person without a substantial
reward of some sort (whether monetary or emotional). Under the
current regime, only about 6,000 living donors volunteer each year.
Almost all of them specify who is to receive their kidney, and as
a consequence the donor has the satisfaction of saving the life
of a family member or friend, and presumably enjoys the recipient’s gratitude as well. Potential donors undergo screening, both
medical and psychological. While donors do not have to pay the
expense of the screening and operation, they may have lost earnings at the time that are not reimbursed. If they experience medical consequences years later, no financial help will be forthcoming
from the beneficiaries of their gift or the kidney-donation system.
Everything about this process leans against making an impulsive decision to donate. Indeed, those who choose to become a
donor may typically see it as an obligation rather than an opportunity. They may be under pressure from family members or may
not see any acceptable alternative to the unpleasant prospect of
donating. There is nothing of the “temptation” in this scenario,
given the delays, the counseling, and the fact that much of the
pain and risk precede the usually rewarding event of donation.
If the system for screening potential donors were preserved, but
now with the possibility of compensation (for the sake of argument, say, worth $50,000) then many more donors would come
forward, especially for non-directed donations. For the additional
donors, the payment would be a stronger incentive than the psychic rewards of a pure altruistic act. (In fact, in this regime some
would-be family donors may decide to refrain, given the knowledge
that other suitable kidneys are available.) The increase in donations would save many lives and reduce costs to taxpayers. But the
question remains of whether the promise of payment would tend
to encourage donations that are not in the donors’ true interest
as a decision analyst would define that interest.
For the potential donor, the prospect of financial reward may
overcome concerns about the temporary pain and disability, the
slight risk of death stemming from the operation, as well as the
small probability of medical problems years or decades later. There is
nothing intrinsically irrational about a willingness to assume medical
risk in exchange for a substantial amount of money. But the quality
of the choice may be influenced by the sequence of events. If donors
were offered a $50,000 check on the day that they volunteered to

donate, but did not have to actually go on the operating table for a
year, impulsive, ill-considered donations might be the norm. But the
disproportionate temptation of an immediate payoff could be managed if the payment were not made until after the operation, which
in the normal course of events would take weeks or even months
while the donor underwent screening and matching.
The delayed payoff would have the effect of protecting potential
donors against impulsive decisions while respecting their underlying
preferences for the value of the money vis-à-vis the medical risks
of donation. The delay is in the spirit of the “nudge” approach to
policy design popularized by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. It
is in contrast to a paternalistic approach that denies the validity of
the donor’s preferences. A recent survey, for example, found a sizable
group that thought it was unacceptable to offer potential subjects
in a risky medical experiment compensation of as much as $10,000.
The authors speculated that these respondents thought that a large
payoff would induce people to participate who placed “too much”
value on money (or too little on their health). These respondents
were in effect privileging their own values over those of others.
The same concerns that apply to the quality of kidney donor
decisions also apply to the decision to sign a contract to play in
the NFL. Players are given little information about the risks. The
longer-term risks (including the risk of CTE in middle age) have
not been well quantified but appear to be far higher than for
kidney donation. The payoff in both financial terms and status
is also very high and immediate. Any counseling or screening that
might occur is up to the player to pursue.
Exploitation, coercion, race, and class / Living kidney donors in
the United States have above-average incomes (after adjusting
for sex and age), perhaps as one reflection of the financial losses
experienced by donors. In a new regime in which donors were
paid a substantial fee, it is predictable that the influx of volunteers would have below-average incomes. The prospect of
financially stressed individuals attempting to make ends meet by
“selling” a kidney raises a red flag for some ethicists.
A compensation regime would expand the choice set for those
in comfortable circumstances, but those in desperate circumstances might feel compelled to sell a kidney; in that sense, the
option of selling could be seen as “coercive.” Furthermore, a system that in part depended on the poor to supply kidneys could be
seen as “exploiting” the poor. This line of thought is represented
in a 2001 report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
about paid participation in medical experiments:

Benefits threaten … the voluntary nature of the choice, … raise
the danger that the potential participant’s distributional
disadvantage could be exploited [and] … lead some prospective
participants to enroll … when it might be against their better
judgment and when otherwise they would not do so.

We believe that using words like “coercion” and “exploitation”
to characterize the introduction of a new option by which poor
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people (and others) could earn a substantial amount of money
provides more heat than light to this situation. Just because living
donors would have lower incomes than current donors does not
support a ban on compensation, which in fact limits the options
available to the poor and thereby makes a bad situation (their
lack of marketable assets) worse. But for anyone not persuaded
by this argument, we note that these social justice concerns apply
with at least equal force to compensating boxers; most American
professional boxers were raised in lower-income neighborhoods
and are either black or Hispanic.
As more has become known about the dangers of repeated
head trauma, similar arguments regarding football have become
more prominent. About 70% of NFL players are black, and Pacific
Islanders are also overrepresented as compared to the American
population. Accordingly, much attention has been paid to the
concussion crisis as a race and class problem. As one observer
recently noted, “What’s a little permanent brain damage when
you’re facing a life of debilitating poverty?” In reality, however,
NFL players are better educated themselves, and come from better
educated homes, than is average for Americans, in part because
the NFL typically recruits college students. Still, some NFL players,
like some would-be kidney donors, come from poverty.
CONCLUSION

Our claim is that there is a stronger case for compensating kidney
donors than for compensating participants in violent sports. If
this proposition is accepted, one implication is that there are
only three logically consistent positions: allow compensation
for both kidney donation and for violent sports; allow compensation for kidney donation but not for violent sports; or allow
compensation for neither. Our current law and practice is perverse in endorsing a fourth regime: allowing compensation for
violent sports but not kidney donation.
As to social justice concerns, we offer both a direct response
and a response by analogy with violent sport. A fundamental
norm of our culture and legal tradition is to respect the choices of
(sane, sober, well informed, adult) individuals. That norm serves
to limit government interference with private choices. It is supported by the right to liberty from undue government interference.
A well-developed organ procurement process in the American
system seeks to ensure that potential donors are fully capable of
making a good decision. Potential kidney donors are not only
provided with full information, but also screened for mental and
physical disability. While there is the possibility of “mistakes” (a
decision to donate against the true best interests of the individual)
under a compensated system, the screening, consent process, and
delays should minimize the chance for the kind of errors that
behavioral economics has demonstrated are common. Under
such circumstances, the opportunity to be paid for donating a
kidney is not exploitative or coercive, but rather welfare-enhancing.
We also argue by analogy with professional football, boxing,
and other legal but violent sports. The medical risks to a profes-
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sional career in these sports are much greater both in the near and
long term than the risks of donating a kidney. On the other hand,
the consent and screening process in professional sports is not
as developed as in kidney donation. The social justice concerns
stem from the fact that most players are black and some come
from impoverished backgrounds. In sum, the arguments against
compensating kidney donors apply with equal or greater force to
compensating athletes in these sports.
Note that these arguments focus on the donors’ welfare and
ignore the welfare of people in need of a kidney. A comprehensive
evaluation of amending NOTA to allow compensation requires
that both groups be considered. Such an evaluation, conducted by
P.J. Held and colleagues, reached the following conclusion about a
regime in which living donors were offered enough compensation
($45,000) to end the kidney shortage:
From the viewpoint of society, the net benefit from saving thousands of lives each year and reducing the suffering of 100,000
more receiving dialysis would be about $46 billion per year,
with the benefits exceeding the costs by a factor of 3. In addition, it would save taxpayers about $12 billion each year.

The present value of this flow of social benefits would exceed
$1.3 trillion.
As far as we know, there has been no cost–benefit analysis of
the analogous reform in football, namely to ban professional
compensation. But a first cut is the market value of NFL teams
because that value reflects the present value of future ticket sales
and broadcast payments, net of costs, under the current legal
regime. Presumably a ban on compensation would end professional football and drive the value of the 32 current teams to zero.
That current value, according to Forbes, is about $56 billion. That
amount should be modified to take account of subsidies by host
cities, and in the other direction to take account of consumer
surplus, but regardless it is clear that the monetized value of
allowing compensation for professional football players is far less
R
than for allowing compensation for kidney donors.
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